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trial tactics

Cross-Examining the
Defendant about Other
Witnesses
By Stephen A. Saltzburg

A

number of federal and state courts have addressed the question of whether it is permissible for the prosecution to cross-examine
a defendant on the stand as to whether or not the
defendant believes that the government’s witnesses
are lying. As a result of the common practice of sequestering witnesses, the defendant is often the only
potential witness to hear all other witnesses in the
case, and, thus, is the only witness who can opine
about the testimony of other witnesses. Since the
government has completed its case-in-chief before
any defense witness testifies, there is no opportunity
for a defense lawyer to ask a government witness,
even one who is exempt from sequestration (a representative of the government under Federal Rule of
Evidence 615, for example), about the testimony of
defense witnesses—unless the witness is recalled during rebuttal and questioning about the witness’s beliefs concerning the credibility of defense witnesses
is within the scope of redirect examination. Thus,
those courts that have addressed the question have
asked whether or not it is fair to single out the testifying defendant for this type of cross-examination.

United States v. Schmitz: The Charges

United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir.
2011), is one of the cases to have addressed the
question most recently. Suzanne L. Schmitz was a
former Alabama state legislator who was charged
with and convicted of three counts of mail fraud
and four counts of theft concerning a program receiving federal funds. The prosecution alleged and
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proved that Schmitz abused her position as a state
legislator to obtain employment with the federally
funded Community Intensive Treatment for Youth
Program for at-risk youth where she collected over
$177,000 in salary and other benefits. The government’s case rested on proof that she performed
little or no work and rarely even showed up at the
office. Schmitz took the salary but generated virtually no services or work product.
During the first month of her employment, for
example, a computer technician set up her work
computer and left a note with her username and
password in a sealed envelope in her desk drawer. Approximately a month later, the technician
found the sealed envelope was still in the drawer—
Schmitz had not used the computer. Despite the
almost complete failure to perform, she managed
to obtain a flexible work schedule, which made it
more difficult to track her performance, and submitted false and fraudulent statements regarding
both how many hours she worked and what and
how much she produced.

The Defendant Testified

Schmitz took the stand in her own defense and
testified on direct examination. Her testimony
contradicted that of government witnesses, and
the prosecution cross-examined by asking her
whether she contended that the government witnesses were lying:
Q (prosecutor): [L]et’s get a list going of everybody you say is lying, okay? Seth Hammett.
He’s a liar?
A (defendant): I said I—what I answered was my
answer is different from his. I never called him
a liar.
Q: Did he tell the truth when he said that you
came to him and asked him to put money in
the budget to fund your job?
A: No, he did not.
Q: He lied?
A: I never used the word “lie.”
Q: Why not?
A: I just don’t like the word.
Q: So he didn’t tell the truth. Does that make
you feel better?
(Id. at 1267.)
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The prosecutor named 12 witnesses who had testified in the case and asked Schmitz if they should
be added to the “list” of purported liars. Schmitz responded each time much as she did in the exchange
above. According to the court of appeals, the prosecutor repeatedly questioned her until he was able
to force her to say whether a previous witness was
telling the truth or should be added to the “liar list.”
The prosecutor referred during closing arguments
to the list of purported lying witnesses and argued
that the jury should reject the notion that 17 people
lied and only the defendant told the truth.
Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s cross-examination or to the closing argument. Thus, on appeal Schmitz could obtain only
plain error review.

The Impropriety of the Cross-Examination

The court of appeals noted that most federal
courts that have examined the issue have found
that it is improper for a prosecutor to question a
defendant about the credibility of other witnesses
because determining credibility is the province of
the jury rather than the parties. The court went
on to offer four reasons why this type of crossexamination should be prohibited.
First, the court found that the questions put by
the prosecutor were barred by the Federal Rules
of Evidence:
While Rule 608(a) permits a witness to testify, in the form of opinion or reputation
evidence, that another witness has a general
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,
that rule does not permit a witness to testify
that another witness was truthful or not on a
specific occasion. Moreover, the were-theylying questions have little or no probative
value because they seek an answer beyond
the personal knowledge of the witness. . . .
The were-they-lying questions are also not
relevant because one witness’s opinion that
another person has or has not lied does not
make it more or less likely that the person
actually lied. Fed. R. Evid. 401. And, the
were-they-lying questions distract the jury
from the central task of determining what
version of events is accurate in order to determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence.
(Id. at 1268–69.)
Second, the court agreed with other federal ap-

peals courts that such cross-examination invaded
the province of the jury. Only the jury is to determine whether or not witnesses are lying.
Third, such questions “ignore other possible
explanations for inconsistent testimony” that
“can conflict for many reasons that do not involve
a deliberate intent to deceive. There may be lapses
in memory, differences in perception, or a genuine misunderstanding.” These “questions ignore
all of these innocent explanations, and put the
testifying defendant in a ‘no-win’ situation: The
defendant must either accuse another witness
of lying or undermine his or her own version of
events.” (Id. at 1269.)
Fourth, such questions,
are argumentative, and often their primary
purpose is to make the defendant appear
accusatory. . . . The very structure of the
question is designed to pit the testifying
witness against every other adverse witness,
suggesting to the jury that someone is deliberately deceiving the court and the jury
must choose the culprit. While the jury must
make credibility assessments in determining
guilt or innocence, the were-they-lying questions do not serve this function but prejudicially force the testifying defendant to
accuse or not. Even worse, the defendant’s
answer often does not matter because the
predominate purpose of such questions is
to make the defendant look bad.
(Id. (citations omitted).)
The court expressed no concern that its ruling, and those of the other courts that had barred
similar cross-examination, would unduly restrict
prosecutors. The court agreed that “it is often
necessary on cross-examination to focus a witness on the differences and similarities between
his testimony and that of another witness” and
had no difficulty concluding that “[t]his is permissible provided he is not asked to testify as to
the veracity of the other witness.” (Id. (quoting
United States v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir.
2006)).) The court also recognized that in a particular case a defendant might open the door to
questions about other witnesses possibly lying.
The Schmitz court also held that the prosecutor’s
comments during closing argument were improper
but presented a closer question because “an attorney’s statements that indicate his opinion or knowl-

Published in Criminal Justice, Volume 26, Number 4, Winter 2012. © 2012 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced
with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any
form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the
American Bar Association.
CJwi12_web.indd 47

12/20/11 10:22 AM

edge of the case as theretofore presented before the
court and jury are permissible if the attorney makes
it clear that the conclusions he is urging are conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” (Id. at 1270
(quoting United States v. Johns, 734 F.2d 657, 663
(11th Cir. 1984)).) Although the court recognized
that a prosecutor may be justified in arguing during
closing argument that a particular witness is lying
where such an inference is supported by the evidence in the cases, the court concluded that the argument as to Schmitz was improper because “they
were a clear continuation of the improper questions
posed previously during Schmitz’s cross-examination.” (Id.) The court observed that the prosecutor
emphasized in closing argument the concept of a
“liar list” that had been improperly developed during Schmitz’s cross-examination.

The Result on Appeal

Although the Schmitz opinion puts prosecutors
on notice of the general impermissibility of questioning a testifying defendant about whether other
witnesses are truthful or untruthful, the opinion
is also a reminder to defense counsel of the importance of raising timely and specific objections
because the court ultimately found that there was
no plain error in Schmitz. The court observed that
neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit had opined on the propriety of the type of
questions at issue prior to the decision in Schmitz.
Ultimately the court affirmed the mail fraud
convictions, but held, 2–1 that defects in the indictment required reversal of the convictions for
theft relating to a program receiving federal funds.

Lessons

1. Even where the law is not well established, it is

important for counsel to object to questions that
appear to violate applicable evidence rules. In
Schmitz, for example, the court pointed out that
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a) limits the type of
testimony that may be admitted with respect to a
witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. An objection that the prosecutor’s questions
violated Rule 608 might well have caused the trial
judge to consider carefully whether such questions could legitimately be asked.
2. It is now clear that prosecutors in the normal case in the Eleventh Circuit (and probably in
most other places) may not ask a testifying defendant to opine on the credibility of other witnesses.
The overwhelming majority of federal and state
courts have reached the same conclusion not only
because of rules like Federal Rule of Evidence
608(a), but also because it seems very clear that
courts would not permit the defense to have the
defendant offer an opinion that defense witnesses
were testifying truthfully. Although the Supreme
Court and the Eleventh Circuit may not have
spoken to the precise question prior to Schmitz,
the law throughout the United States was clear
enough that one witness in a trial could not go
beyond offering opinion or reputation testimony
and opine as to whether another witness was telling the truth on a particular occasion. It is just a
little clearer as a result of the Schmitz decision.
3. Like most general rules, the prohibition on
the questions asked in Schmitz is always subject
to an exception when a defendant opens the door
by voluntary testimony on direct examination. A
defendant who volunteers testimony that other
witnesses are lying is subject to cross-examination
that may address the defendant’s opinion about
these other witnesses. n
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